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Abstract 
 In this study, we examine the impact of top management pay and relative pay (manager 
pay divided by average worker pay) on a firm‘s productivity. We use data from China, which is 
an interesting setting for our research as it is transitioning from a centrally planned economy 
with professed egalitarian pay to a free market system, albeit with socialist characteristics. We 
find that top management pay is positively associated with high productivity while relative pay is 
negatively associated. Our results provide support for the view that workers are alienated when 
their incomes are far lower than that of top management and this leads to lower productivity. 
This effect is most pronounced in labor intensive firms. We also find some evidence that the 
negative impact of relative pay on a firm‘s productivity is reduced in private controlled listed 
firms. 
 
JEL classification: D60, J4 
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 1 
Pay incentives and firm efficiency in a socialist capitalist system 
 
1. Introduction 
Plato: The income of the highest paid should never be more than five times that of the lowest 
paid. 
Effective reward systems that relate pay to performance will enhance a firm‘s efficiency and 
economic value. Whether compensation systems are effective in practice has been the subject of 
much debate and academic study. While there are sound arguments for relating top management 
pay to a firm‘s performance, the magnitude of the rewards have led to increasing pay disparities 
with other employees in the organization. This raises the interesting research question of whether 
the widening pay differences between top management and other employees within an 
organization have an impact on a firm‘s efficiency. The widening pay differences within a firm‘s 
workforce, mirrors the widening income disparities within society as a whole (OECD, 2011). 
There are several theories on the impact of pay disparities between top managers and other 
employees in the organization on workers‘ behaviors and these lead to conflicting predictions on 
the effects of relative pay on firm efficiency. One theory argues that large differences between 
the pay of managers and workers
1
 will lead to feelings of inequity, which in turn spawn 
destructive behaviors that reduce an organization‘s efficiency (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Deutsch, 
1985). A contrasting theory is that high pay disparities may be a signal to low earning workers 
that their compensation will increase in the future and this will make them work harder (Clark et 
al., 2009; Card et al., 2011). Tournament theory posits that high wage disparity is a useful 
motivator of work effort and encourages healthy competition among employees to achieve 
                                                 
1
 To ease exposition, we use the term ‗management‘ for the top executives in the firm and ‗workers‘ (or ‗average 
worker‘) for other employees. Workers can include middle and lower level managers, engineers, and technicians, as 
well as unskilled labor. 
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higher levels of both rank and pay (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). Empirical studies have purported 
to provide evidence for each of these theories.
2
  
The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of compensation policies on the 
productive efficiency of listed firms in China. China is a particularly interesting setting for our 
research because it is transitioning from a centrally-planned economy to a free market system. 
Life-time employment practices have been abandoned and labor markets have developed rapidly. 
This transition represents a major challenge to China‘s socialist principles. Two forces are at play. 
In adopting a market economy, firms have been encouraged, or forced by competition, to adopt 
incentive pay systems that mirror those in Western countries. Under capitalism, one way to 
‗solve‘ the agency problem created by the separation of ownership of listed companies from their 
control, is through executive remuneration contracts that provide an ex ante incentive for 
managers to create shareholder value by allowing the manager to share ex post in the gains thus 
obtained (Holmström, 1999). On the other hand, given its historical socialist principle of 
egalitarianism, China‘s government is very concerned about social unrest as it relaxes that 
principle. This juxtaposition of socialism and capitalism has led to China‘s economic system 
being labeled as ‗capitalism with socialist principles‘ or ‗socialist capitalism‘. 
Using data from the period 2001 to 2006, we find that top management pay has grown at a 
compound rate of 16% per year. During the same period there has been an increase in average 
relative pay (top management pay divided by the average worker‘s pay) from 4.94 in 2001 to 
6.01 in 2006. However, these averages hide a wide range of relative pay. In some firms the 
relative pay approaches 50. While pay disparities in China have increased in recent years they 
are still far below those seen in developed countries. 
We show that top management compensation is positively associated with firm performance 
                                                 
2
 Some differences in the results across studies are due to the way reference groups are formed. 
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measured by total factor productivity and sales per employee. However, top management pay 
relative to the average worker‘s pay is negatively correlated with firm performance. This 
negative relationship is more pronounced for those firms with higher labor costs in their cost 
structure. The negative relation between relative pay and productivity is lessened in private 
controlled listed firms. We find no statistical evidence that the negative impact of relative pay on 
productivity is attenuated for firms located in those provinces where government intervention is 
high. 
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature on CEO compensation. We examine 
the absolute and relative executive compensation on firm performance simultaneously. The 
results show a sharp tension between top management interests and other workers‘ feelings in an 
organization. Managers work hard to improve firm performance when they are rewarded for 
doing so. However, high top management pay without reciprocal increases in pay for other 
employees leads to a reduction in firm efficiency. The results are consistent with increases in 
relative pay leading to feelings of injustice, which may alienate some workers and lead to lower 
productivity.  
 We provide evidence that is consistent with the findings in the happiness and relative 
income literature. Individuals may derive utility not from their absolute level of own income but 
rather from their level of income relative to others. Some prior research has found that the higher 
pay of others has a negative effect on one‘s reported well-being after controlling for one‘s own 
income (Clark and Oswald, 1996; Luttmer, 2005). Our results indicate that wider disparities in 
pay hurt morale and productivity and result in poorer firm performance.   
 Finally, our analyses of what types of firms are more affected by relative pay add to the 
literature on the ways that firms are organized. We find some evidence that the type of ownership, 
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private or state, matters. As expected, we find that productivity in labor intensive firms is more 
negatively affected by high top management to worker pay differentials. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the literature review and hypotheses 
development. This section describes the general framework for setting top executive pay in 
China and introduces the research questions that we investigate. We present the research design 
in section 3 and describe the sample, variable selection, and the regression models. Section 4 
describes the empirical results. Section 5 presents conclusions. 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1. Theories on relative pay 
 High pay disparities between different ranks of employees and managers, as exist in many 
firms in the U.S., can be explained by tournament theory (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Lazear, 1991; 
Main et al., 1993; Lynch, 2005; Lee, Lev, and Yeo, 2008; Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaren, 2009). 
Here, pay disparities increase in the upper hierarchies of an organization. This creates strong 
incentives for lower level managers and employees to compete hard for promotion and they will 
exert substantial effort and commitment to win the tournament prize (the large increase in 
compensation that goes with the promotion). The increase in effort will benefit the firm‘s 
stockholders. 
 Low pay disparity can be explained by relative depravation and distributive justice theories, 
which say that lower level managers and employees feel aggrieved at the high pay of their 
superiors and therefore cooperation declines in the organization (Deutsch, 1985; Henderson and 
Fredrickson, 2001). The resentment created by high pay disparities can jeopardize the firm‘s 
profitability and efficiency (Dye, 1984; Lazear, 1989; Siegel and Hambrick, 2005). Research on 
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the impact of wage differences within an organization has shown evidence that increased 
disparity is associated with lower productivity, less cooperation, and increased turnover (Bloom 
and Michel, 2002, Finkelstein, 1996, Pfeffer and Langton, 1993). To remedy this, an egalitarian 
approach, where pay differences between top managers and other workers are small, may lead to 
greater productivity (Bloom, 1999; Drago and Garvey, 1998; Levine, 1991). However, there are 
counter-arguments that compressed pay levels reduce incentives and lead to poor corporate 
performance (Hibbs and Locking, 2000; Lallemand, Plasman, and Rycx, 2004). 
The relative income hypothesis states that relative income, instead of, or in addition to 
absolute income, is what determines utility. It is social norms, social comparisons, and reference 
values that influence individuals‘ subjective evaluations of their economic situations and weaken 
the relation between income and happiness that one would observe based only on absolute 
income. Clark and Oswald (1996) show, using regression analysis that controls for standard 
individual and demographic characteristics, that utility depends on income relative to some 
reference or comparison income. Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) find that the income of 
the reference group is as important as own income for an individual‘s happiness. In contrast, 
Charness and Kuhn (2007) find the workers‘ efforts are not related to relative pay. 
While many studies, including those referenced above, show that high wage differences 
between employees in an organization can lead to feelings of inequity (Brown et al., 2008; Clark 
et al., 2008; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005), other research has reached an opposite conclusion (Card 
et al., 2011). High wage disparities among employees of an organization can be a signal that 
future wages of the lower paid employees will increase. Here, the positive future pay signal 
outweighs the negative status effect of low relative pay (Clark et al., 2009). One reason for the 
differences in the empirical results reported to date is the different reference groups used in 
 6 
calculating relative pay.
3
 In our study, we compare top management pay and the pay of other 
employees within the same organization. 
2.2. Caps on top management pay 
There is increasing public outrage over the seemingly excessive compensation packages 
granted to top executives. Some people view the ―Wall Street bonus culture‖ as a root cause of 
the recent financial crisis. ―Excessive‖ top management pay can also affect morale within an 
organization. Bok (1993) argues that the huge size of executive salaries and bonuses, even if they 
can be justified on economic grounds, can have a negative impact on others in the organization 
by engendering feelings of inequity that can weaken loyalty and increase dysfunctional conflict.  
In some countries, governments have recently imposed stringent limits on executive 
compensation after the financial crisis of 2008/2009. In February 2009, the Obama 
Administration announced that executive compensation in firms that received funds from the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) should be limited as a condition of the bail-out from the 
distress caused by the financial crisis in 2008. On July 31, 2009, the United States House of 
Representatives passed the Say-on-Pay Bill, which requires a non-binding vote by shareholders 
to approve executive compensation (Seitzinger, 2009). The German Financial Markets 
Stabilization Act (Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetz) that became effective on 18 October 2008 
empowers the government to formulate and enforce restrictions on executive compensation for 
all firms that receive government aid from the stabilization fund. These regulations reflect public 
outrage over what are perceived as excessive compensation packages granted to executives 
despite the failure of their firms. However, the empirical evidences on the effectiveness of 
compensation restrictions are mixed. Cai and Walkling (2011) find a positive market reaction for 
                                                 
3
 There are various ways that reference groups could be formed. McBride (2001) uses people in the same age group, 
within 5 years younger or older than the individual concerned, as a reference group, while Easterlin (1995) 
implicitly assumes that individuals compare themselves with all the other citizens of the same country. 
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firms with high excess compensation when the U.S. House passed the first Say-on-Pay Bill in 
2007. Ferri and Maber (2010) argue that, in the United Kingdom, Say-on-Pay legislation 
decreases the possibilities for "rewards for failure." However, Verret (2009) posits that limiting 
manager compensation in the U.S. may harm the economy in the globalized environment. 
Clementi and Cooley (2009) argue that many CEOs, in fact, are not excessively paid since the 
compensation distribution is highly skewed. They show that the median CEO compensation in 
U.S. firms in 2006 was only $4.85 million, while the average is much higher, $10.8 million, 
suggesting that the income inequality problem may be exaggerated. Macey (2009) argues that the 
legislative salary limits could lead to even higher levels of compensation as was the case with the 
1993 compensation tax code reforms, which were intended to limit excessive growth in 
executive compensation.  
China‘s government has an ambivalent attitude toward top management pay. While 
encouraging firms to make top managers more accountable and make pay depend on 
performance, the government is acutely aware that other employees may feel aggrieved by high 
pay disparities. In light of this, the local and central government have issued a variety of 
regulations and guidance that limit managers‘ compensation. In 1986, the government stated that 
top managers could receive up to three times the average worker‘s pay if they met performance 
targets. In 1988 and 1992, regulations were changed such that the performance targets were 
explained in more detail. The effective cap on top executive pay under the revised regulations 
was still three times the average wage. In 2002 and 2006 state regulations allowed pay 
relativities to increase to 12 and 14, respectively. These pay differences had to be justified by 
performance. The above-mentioned pay regulations relate to government controlled firms and 
the increases in maximum relativities over time reflect the need of these firms to compete with 
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the privately controlled firms for top managers. 
There is public unrest about the increasing compensation of executives at listed firms in 
China (SCMP 2006, 2009) and the government is becoming more concerned with the growing 
wealth gap (SCMP 2010).
4
 The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC), which is a government unit that administers many of the state‘s 
stockholdings in listed firms, announced plans to investigate the salary increases of senior 
executives of state controlled listed firms (SCMP 2007). This concern over high pay mirrors, to 
some extent, the ‗say-on-pay‘ and ‗caps on pay‘ debates in the developed world. 
2.3. Hypotheses 
 The prior literature and anecdotal evidence has given conflicting evidence on whether top 
management pay and high pay relativities affect a firm‘s performance. However, this evidence 
comes from developed countries with stable economic systems. In order to address the question 
of incentive pay and relative pay in China we develop four hypotheses. The first hypothesis is:  
Hypothesis 1: there is a positive association between the absolute level of top management 
compensation and firm productivity and a negative association between the relative level of top 
management compensation and firm productivity. 
Our hypothesis assumes a positive impact of top management pay on performance 
(incentive impact) and a negative impact for relative pay on performance (large relative pay 
leads to conflict and a loss of morale within the workforce, which has a negative impact on 
performance). As our reference groups are top management pay and the average pay of all other 
workers in the firm, we believe high pay disparities will alienate the workers and productivity 
will decline. Hence we formulate our theory based on this view of the world. In contrast, if we 
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 This public unrest also occurs in the developed economies. For example, there is widespread outrage in the U.S. 
and Europe at the increases in top executive pay at firms that concurrently or subsequently report large losses, fire 
large parts of the workforce, and that receive financial assistance from the state.  
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find that there is a positive relation between relative pay and performance this will give support 
to tournament theory and the signaling effect theory of higher future earnings. We expect that 
tournament theory and the signaling theory will be more relevant when the reference groups are 
closer. 
A striking characteristic of the listed firms in China is that there is a single dominant owner, 
be it the state or private person, which has effective control of the company. On average, the 
largest single investor owns 46% of a listed firm and the second largest investor owns about 7% 
(Chen, Firth, and Xu, 2009). We are therefore able to characterize a listed firm as state controlled 
or privately controlled depending on who the major stockholder is.  Workers in state controlled 
listed firms are likely to have always worked in the state sector and are used to egalitarian pay 
and socialist principles. In comparison, workers in private controlled firms may be more 
accepting of wide pay disparities. Thus, workers in state controlled listed firms will feel more 
aggrieved at highly disparate pay and this translates into poorer work attitudes and lower firm 
efficiency. Our second hypothesis is: 
 Hypothesis 2: the negative association between relative compensation and firm performance 
should be more pronounced for state controlled listed firms. 
 Amason (1996) finds that affective conflict is significantly and negatively related to both 
decision quality and affective acceptance of decisions while Jehn (1995) finds that interpersonal 
conflict creates problems with decision-making and hence affects performance. Lazear (1989) 
and Levine (1991) use equity-based (fairness-based) arguments to conclude that less pay 
dispersion is necessary in groups to reinforce desirable social behaviors, such as cooperation, 
communication, and effort. High wage differences within an organization can hurt morale and 
productivity. In particular, large disparities in pay can lead to a lack of motivation, increased 
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turnover and absenteeism, and increased anti-management activity. Pay dispersion will be 
associated with higher dysfunctional affective conflict and lower useful cognitive conflict 
especially when the interdependence or team work among jobs is important. Based on the above 
arguments, our third hypothesis is: 
 Hypothesis 3: the negative association between relative compensation and firm performance 
should be more pronounced for those firms requiring more team work.  
 Prior literature documents that governments have incentives to intervene in the operations 
of firms and this is especially so in socialist or transitional economies. For example, Fan, Wong, 
and Zhang (2007) find that the Chinese government drives SOEs to diversify into unprofitable 
industries and expand production to promote the local economy. However, government 
intervention in a local economy varies across the different regions of China and this will have an 
impact on how pay incentivizes managers and how pay disparity affects workers‘ behaviors. 
High government involvement in a local economy may reduce the negative impact of high pay 
disparities. Here, the workers are either intimidated by government and do not complain about 
high pay relativities or else they believe government intervention will benefit them. Using an 
index of government intervention in the economy, we examine these effects in the next 
hypothesis: 
 Hypothesis 4: the negative association between the relative compensation and firm 
performance should be attenuated in regions where there is higher government intervention. 
 
3. Data and empirical design 
3.1. Sample 
Our sample is non-financial companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
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exchanges (China‘s two stock markets) in the period 2001 to 2006. We start in 2001 as that is the 
year that firms were required to publish executive pay information; prior to 2001, some firms did 
not disclose this information even though they were strongly recommended to do so. We end our 
sample period in 2006 for two reasons. First, there were major changes in accounting standards 
beginning in 2007 that make comparisons with earlier years more difficult. Second, there were 
changes in the way the average employee wage is reported from 2007 onwards, which leads to 
data compatibility problems. We exclude financial firms because they are heavily regulated. The 
data on compensation and company characteristics come from the CSMAR database and annual 
reports. The CSMAR database is marketed by GTA Corporation, one of the largest and most 
established data vendors of security prices and accounting data in China. Our sample is 5,744 
firm-year observations.  
Executive directors‘ compensation has to be disclosed in a firm‘s financial statements. 
Compensation consists of salary and bonus although most firms do not distinguish between the 
two and instead they report one lump sum. From 2005 the pay of the CEO or managing director 
is disclosed but the data are incomplete in the earlier years. Since 2001, firms have disclosed the 
collective pay of the three highest paid directors and we use the average of this pay as an 
independent variable (there are more data on the pay of the three highest paid directors than the 
pay of the CEO and so we use the former).
5
 In China, the top executives sit on the firm‘s board 
and so the three highest paid directors will be the three highest paid managers. 
3.2. Regression models 
The general form of the regression models is as follows: 
controlsRelPayCOMPRelPayCOMPPERF  *3210   (1) 
                                                 
5
 The average is computed as the total pay of the three highest paid directors, divided by three. 
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We employ two variables to measure a firm‘s performance, TFP and SaleLab. TFP is total 
factor productivity.  Here, we regress a firm‘s natural logarithm of total sales on two factors, the 
logarithms of labor and capital, within each industry for each year, to arrive at the annual 
Cobb-Douglas production function for an industry. The number of employees is used as a proxy 
of a company‘s labor input and the value of fixed assets is used as a proxy of its capital input. We 
then use the estimated industry-level production function to predict a firm‘s expected production 
level and take the difference between it and the actual production as the TFP of the firm. SaleLab 
is sales to number of employees (divided by 1,000,000). Comp is the average annual 
compensation of the three highest paid directors (divided by 1,000,000).  RelPay is the ratio of 
average annual compensation of the three highest paid directors to the average annual salary of 
an employee.  
We also include the following control variables. LnBSize is the log value of the number of 
directors on the board. IndDir is the proportion of the number of independent directors to the 
total number of directors on the board. Post is a dummy variable coded 1 if the chairman and the 
general manager are different persons and 0 otherwise. LnAsset is the log value of total assets. 
LivExp is the family living expenditure level (i.e., a cost of living index) of the province where 
the firm is located (divided by 1,000). LnFirmAge is the log value of the number of years the 
firm has been listed. DA is debt to total assets. MB is the market value of equity to the book value 
of equity. ROA is return on assets. Private is a dummy variable that is coded one if the 
controlling stockholder is a private entity or person; Private is coded zero if the dominant 
stockholder is the state (central, regional, or municipal government or an associated ministry or 
agency). State controlled firms may be more subject to political interference and the managers 
are more likely to be political appointees or former civil servants. Furthermore, state controlled 
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listed firms may be given a variety of objectives to follow (Shleifer, 1998) and managers will be 
rewarded for achieving these objectives. This may affect a firm‘s productivity. Industry and year 
dummies are additional controls. Industry is based on the expanded list of industries as 
designated by the China Securities and Regulatory Commission (CSRC). 
We run the regressions with both contemporaneously and lagged independent variables. As 
both sets of results are similar, we just report the results using contemporaneously measured 
independent variables. We do not use panel models because some of the variables (e.g., 
governance and ownership variables) do not change over time and so their impact will be 
washed-out in panel models. We use robust standard errors to correct for firm clustering, 
heterogeneity, and autocorrelation.  
We also use change in performance from one year to the next as the dependent variable. The 
independent variables include the change in compensation and relative pay. The model is: 
controlsRelPayCOMPRelPayCOMPPERF  *3210   (2) 
Equation (2) is used to measure sensitivities. PERF is total factor productivity or sales per 
employee. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Basic statistics 
 Table 1 Panel A shows the means, medians, and standard deviations of the variables. The 
mean and median compensation for the highest paid executive directors are 173,000 RMB and 
123,500 RMB, respectively (this is the total pay for the three highest paid directors of a firm 
divided by three). RelPay has a median of 5.74 which indicates that the average top management 
pay is nearly six times the wage of the average worker. This is much lower than in the U.S. 
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where Kim and Lu (2009) report that for the average S&P 500 firm in 2003 the CEO earned 300 
times what the average production worker earned. This was up from 30 times more in the 1970s. 
Based on developed countries‘ norms, pay disparity is low in China and this is consistent with 
the government‘s avowed intent to avoid social disharmony created by wide wealth gaps.  
****************** 
Table 1 here 
****************** 
 The mean of total factor productivity is 0.0031. About 29% of firms have a private 
individual or family as the controlling stockholder with the other firms being controlled by local 
or central government, state ministry, or a wholly-state owned enterprise. Approximately 13% of 
firms have a single person occupying both the chair and CEO positions. On average, a firm‘s 
return on assets is low indicating modest to low profitability. GQ measures the government 
involvement in the local economy and is used in testing Hypothesis 4. Here, each province is 
given a score ranging between 1 and 10 with 10 indicating a strong involvement. The data are 
from a World Bank survey. The mean and median of GQ are 5.10 and 4.75, respectively. 
 In Table 2, Panel A, we show the mean and median of top management compensation for 
each year in our sample period. The mean pay increased from 104,300 RMB in 2001 to 222,000 
in 2006. The Table also shows the mean and median pay in each year for firms controlled by the 
government and for firms controlled by private investors. Both types of firm have seen increases 
in top management pay. 
 The annual breakdown of mean and median relative pay is shown in Table 2, Panel B. 
Relative pay has grown over time. However, relative pay is lower in state controlled listed firms. 
This may reflect government influence to keep pay disparities low. Nevertheless, relative pay has 
still increased in state controlled companies. 
****************** 
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Table 2 here 
****************** 
4.2. The relations between the absolute and relative top management compensation and firm 
performance 
 
 We report the regression results on the relations between top management compensation, 
pay relativity, and firm performance (total factor productivity (TFP) and sales per employee 
(SaleLab)) in Table 3. The results of the TFP and SaleLab regressions are reported in Panels A 
and B, respectively. Model 1 of Panel A shows that there is a positive relationship between top 
management compensation and TFP. Model 2 shows that there is a negative association between 
top management compensation relative to the average worker wage (Relpay) and TFP. We 
include Comp, RelPay and the interaction between Comp and RelPay in Model 4. We still find a 
positive coefficient on Comp and a negative coefficient on RelPay. The coefficient on the 
interaction term is negative and significant.  This suggests that the negative association between 
RelPay and performance dominates the positive association between Comp and performance. 
When we replace TFP by SaleLab (see Panel B) as a measure of corporate performance, the 
results are consistent with those of Panel A. In particular, we find a positive relation for Comp 
and negative relations for RelPay and Comp*RelPay.  
 To test the stability of our findings, we rerun the regressions each year. The results 
(untabulated) show that the positive association between Comp and performance holds for each 
year, and the negative association between RelPay and performance also holds for each year. 
Overall, our findings indicate that higher top management compensation can incentivize 
executives to work hard and improve firm performance. The results also indicate that high wage 
disparities between top management and the average worker can hurt firm performance. The 
negative effect of disparities in pay dominates the positive effect of top management pay when 
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we use sales per employee as our measure of firm performance.  
****************** 
Table 3 here 
****************** 
 Following Murphy (1999), we examine pay-performance sensitivities. For the sensitivity 
analyses, we regress change in absolute pay (CompChg) and change in relative pay (RelPayChg) 
on change in performance. The results are reported in Table 4. We find that the coefficient on 
CompChg is positive and the coefficient on RelPayChg is negative. Based on the results in model 
4 (model 8), we find that a 1% increase in top management pay will lead to an increase in TFP 
(SaleLab) of 0.429% (2.44%). Similarly, a 1% increase in RelPay will lead to a reduction in TFP 
(SaleLab) of 0.01% (0.07%).  
****************** 
Table 4 here 
****************** 
4.3. The impact of ownership on the relations between the absolute and relative top management 
compensation and firm performance 
 
 In order to see if the relations between the relative top management pay and firm 
performance are different between private controlled and state controlled firms we use the 
interaction of RelPay with Private, which is a dummy variable coded one if the listed firm is 
controlled by a private investor. The results are reported in Table 5. The dependent variables are 
TFP and Salelab in Panels A and B, respectively. Panel A shows that the interaction terms (with 
Private) attenuate the influence of RelPay on firm performance. RelPay has a negative 
coefficient while RelPay*Private has a positive coefficient in Model 4. However, the interaction 
term is not significant at conventional levels. In Panel B, we also see that private controlled firms 
have less negative coefficients for RelPay. In contrast to Panel A, the interaction terms in Panel 
B are statistically significant. The evidence in Table 5 gives some support for hypothesis 2. 
Employees in private controlled firms appear to be less concerned about high pay disparity 
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between top managers and the average worker compared to their counterparts in state controlled 
firms. 
****************** 
Table 5 here 
****************** 
 
4.4. The impact of cost structure on the relations between the absolute and relative top 
management compensation and firm performance 
 
 The operations of different firms require different levels of interdependence or team work. 
In order to examine how the relations between the absolute and relative top management 
compensation and firm performance are affected by a firm‘s cohesiveness and interpersonal 
cooperation, we use the interaction between Comp and Cost and RelPay and Cost, where Cost is 
the total labor cost to sales. If the total labor cost accounts for a high proportion of sales, it 
represents a labor intensive industry, which requires a high level of cooperation among its 
employees. If wage disparity indeed hurts morale and productivity, firms with higher labor costs 
should be impacted the most. We report the results of our analysis in Table 6. We find the 
coefficients on RelPayCost are significantly negative regardless of whether TFP or Salelab is 
used as the dependent variable. The results are consistent with our hypothesis 3 that the negative 
association between the relative compensation and firm performance should be more pronounced 
for those firms requiring more team work. CompCost has a negative coefficient in panel A and a 
negative and significant coefficient in Panel B. This implies that top executive pay has less 
influence on productivity in labor intensive businesses. 
****************** 
Table 6 here 
****************** 
4.5. The impact of government intervention on the relations between the absolute and relative top 
management compensation and firm performance 
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 Finally, we examine how government intervention affects the relations between the 
absolute and relative top management compensation and firm performance. Our government 
intervention data come from the World Bank survey report ―Governance, Investment Climate, 
and Harmonious Society — Competitiveness Enhancements for 120 Cities in China‖. This 
survey covers 12,400 firms in 120 cities all over China and provides detailed city-level data on 
city characteristics, government effectiveness and progress towards a harmonious society. The 
120 cities are distributed across all provinces except Tibet and the GDP of the 120 cities 
represents 70%-80% of total GDP in China, depending on the year. The data are representative 
and relatively complete.  
 To operationalize our measure of government intervention, we first rank each of the four 
variables of intervention for each year and form deciles. We formulate an aggregated index of 
government quality or intervention (GQ) by averaging the rankings of the four variables for each 
city. Our first variable is effective taxation and administrative fees paid by firms, calculated as 
the percentage of taxation and fees to total sales. Taxation and administrative fees are the 
principal means by which governments extract resources from firms. The second variable is 
expenditure on travel and entertainment by enterprises, calculated as the expenditure on travel 
and entertainment divided by total sales. These costs can be regarded as informal payments to 
government officials and used as a measure of the corruption within the government. The third 
variable is the average annual bureaucratic interaction days, which reflects the amount of time 
firms must spend to interact with government bureaucracies. This variable measures both the 
degree of government intervention and the efficiency of government. Confidence in courts 
reflects whether entrepreneurs have confidence in local courts when they seek a legal solution for 
business disputes. This variable serves as the measure of protection of property rights and the 
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degree of impact by the government through the legal system. The higher GQ is, the higher the 
government intervention is.  
 Hypothesis 4 states that employees may feel less aggrieved about high pay disparities in 
firms that are located in cities where government intervention is high. The main variable of 
interest is the interaction of government intervention (GQ) and RelPay. The results in Table 7 
show negative coefficients on GQ, which indicates that productivity is lower for firms located in 
cities where government intervention is high. However, the result is only significant in Panel B. 
The interactions of GQ with RelPay are not significant. Thus, there is no support for hypothesis 4. 
WHY DO WE INTERACT GQ WITH Comp AND CompRelPay? THIS IS NOT PART OF THE 
HYPOTHESIS. GQ RANGES FROM 0 TO 10. IS IT BETTER TO DO ABOVE MEAN 
(MEDIAN) AND BELOW MEAN (MEDIAN) – i.e., SIMILAR TO COST. NOTE THAT Comp 
BECOMES NOT SIGNIFICANT IN TABLE 6. 
****************** 
Table 7 here 
****************** 
 
5. Conclusion 
China is transitioning from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. This includes 
the opening up of labor markets where managers and workers can change jobs freely. One 
challenge faced by firms is how to alleviate agency costs and this leads to a greater use of 
incentive pay to reward top managers. However, increased rewards to top management results in 
widening pay disparities between them and other employees, which may have an impact on 
workers‘ behaviors and, ultimately, on a firm‘s productive efficiency. China‘s government 
recognizes the need to adequately reward managers but, at the same time, it is acutely aware that 
an increasing gap in incomes between managers and workers might alienate the workers and 
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even lead to social unrest. Under the rigid communist system that operated up to the 1980s there 
was very little difference in cash compensation between the workers and top managers. People 
were indoctrinated with the concepts of egalitarian pay and working for the common good. The 
change to free markets with increasing pay and wealth disparities is a major shock to the 
economic system that can lead to dysfunctional worker behaviors. 
There are several theories that relate to pay disparities, or relative pay, and they give different 
predictions as to the effects of pay differences on a firm‘s productivity. The aim of this study is to 
examine the relative pay between managers and workers within a firm and to investigate the 
impact of RelPay on total factor productivity (TFP) and sales per employee (SaleLab), which are 
measures of a firm‘s efficiency. In doing so, we test which theory best explains the impact of 
relative pay on efficiency in China. 
We find that top executive pay is positively related to a firm‘s productivity measured by both 
total factor productivity and by sales per employee. Pay disparity, measured as the ratio of top 
management pay divided by the average worker‘s pay in the same organization, is negatively 
related to productivity. It appears that high manager to worker pay disparities lead to workers‘ 
resentment over the high pay of their bosses and consequently a firm‘s productivity declines. 
There is some evidence that the negative impact of relative pay is more influential on 
productivity than is the positive impact of top management pay-performance sensitivity. 
There is some statistical evidence that private controlled listed firms are different from state 
controlled listed firms when it comes to the impact of top executive pay and pay relativity on 
productivity. Thus, it appears that the workers‘ views on pay relativities somewhat depend on the 
ownership of the firm they work for. We do, however, find that high pay disparity elicits lower 
productivity in labor intensive firms. There is no statistical evidence that the negative impact of 
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pay relativities on productivity is attenuated for firms located in provinces where there is a lot of 
government intervention in the local economy. 
While the finance literature gives a lot of attention to the design of management incentive 
systems our study is a timely reminder that high pay disparity between the top management and 
the average worker can lead to lower productivity. The resentment created by high pay disparities 
should not be underestimated. Although our results are specific to China we believe they may 
have resonance in other transitional economies that are going through major economic and 
ideological changes. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
TFP is total factor productivity. SaleLab is sales to number of employees (divided by 1,000,000).  Comp is average 
annual compensation of the three highest paid directors (divided by 1,000,000).  RelPay is the ratio of average 
annual compensation of the three highest paid directors to the average annual salary of an employee.  LnBSize is 
the log value of the number of directors on the board. IndDir is the percentage of the number of independent 
directors to total number of directors on the board.  Post is a dummy variable coded 1 if the chairman and the 
general manager are different persons and 0 otherwise.  Private is a dummy variable coded 1 if the firm is a 
privately-owned enterprise and 0 otherwise.  LnAsset is the log value of total assets.  LivExp is the living 
expenditure level of the province where the firm is located (divided by 1,000).  LnFirmAge is the log value of the 
number of years the firm has been listed.  DA is debt to total assets.  MB is market value of equity to book value 
of equity.  ROA is return on assets.  COST is total compensation for employees to sales.  GQ is the aggregate 
measure of government quality. GQ is the average of the decile ranks (from 1 to 10) of 4 measures including Taxes 
and Fees, Entertainment Cost, Bureaucratic Interaction and Confidence in Courts. TFPChg is change in total factor 
productivity.  SaleLabChg is change in sales to number of employees (divided by 1,000,000).  CompChg is 
change in average annual compensation of the three highest paid directors (divided by 1,000,000).  RelPayChg is 
change in the ratio of the average annual compensation of the three highest paid directors to the average annual 
salary of an employee.  AssetChg is change in total assets (divided by 1,000,000,000).  LivExpChg is change in 
living expenditure level of the province where the firm is located (divided by 1,000).  DAChg is change in debt to 
total assets.  MBChg is change in market value of equity to book value of equity.  ROAChg is change in return on 
assets. 
 
                
 Dummy (1) Dummy (0) Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard 
Deviation 
        
TFP   0.0031 -0.0606 12.0199 -7.2978 0.9164 
SaleLab (1,000,000)   0.8202 0.3975 25.8376 0.0002 1.5707 
Comp (1,000,000)   0.1730 0.1235 1.7792 0.0060 0.1640 
RelPay   5.7461 4.0824 53.5652 1.0008 5.2933 
LnBSize   2.2651 2.1972 2.9444 1.3863 0.2181 
IndDir   0.2875 0.3333 0.6000 0.0000 0.1137 
Post 5002 742      
Private 1639 4105      
LnAsset   21.2004 21.1067 27.1111 18.1572 0.9296 
LivExp (1,000)   7.9219 7.0328 14.8254 4.1102 2.7212 
LnFirmAge   1.7462 1.9459 2.8332 0.0000 0.6637 
DA   0.4753 0.4861 0.8994 0.0117 0.1757 
MB   2.7405 2.1623 20.7750 0.3875 1.9995 
ROA   0.0239 0.0285 0.4250 -0.7359 0.0630 
Cost   0.0853 0.0709 0.6794 0.0013 0.0629 
GQ   5.0962 4.7500 9.7500 1.5000 2.0345 
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Table 2 
 
Top Management Pay and Relative Pay Over Time and by Type of Firm Ownership 
 
Panel A: Top Management Pay 
Year All Firms State Controlled Firms Private Controlled Firms 
 N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
747 
881 
921 
1063 
1039 
1093 
0.104 
0.132 
0.161 
0.187 
0.200 
0.222 
0.073 
0.097 
0.119 
0.138 
0.148 
0.172 
550 
654 
674 
746 
728 
753 
0.104 
0.129 
0.158 
0.185 
0.194 
0.219 
0.077 
0.100 
0.120 
0.136 
0.144 
0.166 
197 
227 
247 
317 
311 
340 
0.103 
0.142 
0.169 
0.193 
0.214 
0.226 
0.067 
0.090 
0.117 
0.146 
0.160 
0.174 
Panel B: Relative Pay 
Year All Firms State Controlled Firms Private Controlled Firms 
 N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
747 
881 
921 
1063 
1039 
1093 
4.942 
5.389 
5.803 
6.105 
5.929 
6.010 
3.429 
3.926 
4.181 
4.327 
4.270 
4.367 
550 
654 
674 
746 
728 
753 
4.613 
5.004 
5.353 
5.611 
5.360 
5.502 
3.221 
3.779 
3.881 
3.946 
3.743 
3.868 
197 
227 
247 
317 
311 
340 
5.859 
6.501 
7.030 
7.269 
7.260 
7.136 
4.158 
4.279 
4.860 
5.427 
5.585 
5.646 
Relative pay is top management pay divided by the average worker‘s pay. 
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Table 3 
Multivariate Analysis for Level Compensation 
TFP is total factor productivity.  SaleLab is sales to number of employees (divided by 1,000,000).  Comp is 
average annual compensation of the three highest paid directors (divided by 1,000,000).  RelPay is the ratio of 
average annual compensation of the three highest paid directors to the average annual salary of an employee.  
LnBSize is the log value of the number of directors on the board. IndDir is the percentage of the number of 
independent directors to total number of directors on the board.  Post is a dummy variable coded 1 if the chairman 
and the general manager are different persons and 0 otherwise.  Private is a dummy variable coded 1 if the firm is a 
privately-owned enterprise and 0 otherwise.  LnAsset is the log value of total assets.  LivExp is the living 
expenditure level of the province where the firm is located (divided by 1,000).  LnFirmAge is the log value of the 
number of years the firm has been listed.  DA is debt to total assets.  MB is market value of equity to book value 
of equity.  ROA is return on assets.  t-statistics are computed using robust standard errors. 
 
Panel A: The dependent variable is TFP 
                  
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
 Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t 
                  
Intercept 1.143 2.15 0.092 0.17 0.352 0.64 1.649 2.92 
Comp 0.512 3.77**     1.559 6.22** 
RelPay   -0.020 -6.60**   -0.033 -6.26** 
Comp*RelPay     -0.009 -2.38* -0.022 -2.56** 
LnBSize -0.071 -0.80 -0.026 -0.29 -0.054 -0.60 -0.034 -0.39 
IndDir 0.320 1.52 0.405 1.96* 0.405 1.96* 0.346 1.70 
Post 0.042 0.77 0.018 0.34 0.027 0.49 0.021 0.40 
Private -0.105 -2.07* -0.052 -1.02 -0.078 -1.51 -0.051 -1.01 
LnAsset -0.089 -3.42** -0.037 -1.35 -0.050 -1.89 -0.112 -4.08** 
LivExp 0.055 5.84** 0.059 6.41** 0.061 6.62** 0.038 4.08** 
LnFirmAge -0.168 -5.16** -0.178 -5.27** -0.180 -5.52** -0.157 -4.73** 
DA 0.702 4.84** 0.692 4.89** 0.679 4.68** 0.799 5.70** 
MB 0.017 1.54 0.022 1.97* 0.022 2.00* 0.009 0.78 
ROA 3.184 10.34** 3.462 11.14** 3.354 10.83** 3.093 10.13** 
Industry Dummy included       
Year Dummy included        
Adjusted R
2
 0.099  0.105  0.093  0.131  
F-statistics 20.744  22.629  20.083  27.254  
p-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
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Table 3 (continued) 
Multivariate Analysis for Level Compensation 
 
Panel B: The dependent variable is SaleLab 
                  
 Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  
 Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t 
                  
Intercept -1.704 -2.11 -3.873 -5.18 -5.178 -6.89 -1.104 -1.42 
Comp 1.403 3.94**     4.758 6.79** 
RelPay   -0.046 -10.38**   -0.073 -8.32** 
Comp*RelPay     -0.032 -5.25** -0.105 -3.70** 
LnBSize -0.508 -3.98** -0.399 -3.31** -0.450 -3.89** -0.400 -3.86** 
IndDir -0.318 -0.86 -0.021 -0.06 -0.092 -0.27 -0.277 -0.81 
Post 0.010 0.08 -0.065 -0.54 -0.052 -0.45 -0.100 -0.86 
Private -0.124 -1.71 0.024 0.36 -0.070 -1.03 -0.027 -0.45 
LnAsset 0.136 3.53** 0.255 6.49** 0.286 7.45** 0.088 2.37* 
LivExp 0.074 4.18** 0.078 4.68** 0.083 5.04** 0.038 2.15* 
LnFirmAge -0.036 -0.75 -0.049 -1.02 -0.137 -2.78** -0.011 -0.26 
DA 1.161 4.16** 1.077 4.11** 0.736 3.30** 1.200 4.69** 
MB 0.002 0.12 0.012 0.82 0.032 2.14* -0.011 -0.79 
ROA 2.542 5.96** 3.364 6.80** 2.867 6.26** 2.356 5.99** 
Industry Dummy included         
Year Dummy included         
Adjusted R
2
 0.146  0.169  0.192  0.244  
F-statistics 31.670  38.611  44.982  57.274  
p-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
         
 
* for significance at 0.05 level.   
** for significance at 0.01 level.   
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Table 4 
Multivariate Analysis for the Change in Compensation 
TFPChg is change in total factor productivity.  SaleLabChg is change in sales to number of employees (divided by 
1,000,000).  CompChg is change in average annual compensation of the three highest paid directors (divided by 
1,000,000).  RelPayChg is change in the ratio of the average annual compensation of the three highest paid 
directors to the average annual salary of an employee.  LnBSize is the log value of the number of directors on the 
board. IndDir is the percentage of the number of independent directors to total number of directors on the board.  
Post is a dummy variable coded 1 if the chairman and the general manager are different persons and 0 otherwise.  
Private is a dummy variable coded 1 if the firm is a privately-owned enterprise and 0 otherwise.  AssetChg is 
change in total assets (divided by 1,000,000,000). LivExpChg is change in living expenditure level of the province 
where the firm is located (divided by 1,000).  LnFirmAge is the log value of the number of years the firm has been 
listed.  DA is debt to total assets.  MB is market value of equity to book value of equity.  ROA is return on assets.  
DAChg is change in debt to total assets.  MBChg is change in market value of equity to book value of equity.  
ROAChg is change in return on assets.  t-statistics are computed using robust standard errors. 
 
Panel A: The dependent variable is TFPChg 
                  
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
 Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t 
                  
Intercept -0.169 -1.56 -0.178 -1.57 -0.148 -1.47 -0.170 -1.58 
CompChg 0.143 1.72     0.429 3.63** 
RelPayChg   -0.004 -1.97*   -0.009 -2.96** 
CompChgRelPayChg     -0.012 -1.87 -0.008 -1.27 
LnBSize 0.003 0.08 0.009 0.26 0.019 0.54 0.011 0.31 
IndDir -0.024 -0.19 -0.029 -0.23 0.024 0.22 -0.027 -0.22 
Post 0.006 0.31 0.009 0.44 0.005 0.22 0.010 0.49 
Private -0.008 -0.47 -0.006 -0.35 -0.012 -0.67 -0.009 -0.52 
AssetChg -0.022 -2.22* -0.020 -2.10* -0.019 -1.96* -0.022 -2.21* 
LivExpChg -0.012 -0.56 -0.008 -0.34 -0.009 -0.39 -0.014 -0.63 
LnFirmAge 0.066 3.47** 0.065 3.47** 0.062 3.30** 0.066 3.52** 
DAChg -0.450 -2.77** -0.450 -2.79** -0.458 -2.83** -0.435 -2.70** 
MBChg 0.004 0.43 0.004 0.47 0.005 0.55 0.003 0.35 
ROAChg 1.055 4.52** 1.068 4.56** 1.061 4.55** 1.055 4.50** 
Industry Dummy included        
Year Dummy included         
Adjusted R
2
 0.033  0.035  0.033  0.038  
F-statistics 5.966  6.051  6.605  6.450  
p-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
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Table 4 (continued) 
Multivariate Analysis for the Change in Compensation 
 
Panel B: The dependent variable is SaleLabChg 
                  
 Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  
 Coeff T Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t 
                  
Intercept 0.823 2.77 0.763 2.64 0.793 2.68 0.774 2.72 
CompChg 0.596 2.19*     2.441 4.09** 
RelPayChg   -0.033 -3.26**   -0.065 -3.67** 
CompChgRelPayChg     -0.028 -1.71 0.004 0.18 
LnBSize -0.161 -1.80 -0.141 -1.63 -0.147 -1.65 -0.161 -1.82 
IndDir -0.330 -1.04 -0.330 -1.03 -0.301 -0.96 -0.363 -1.17 
Post -0.003 -0.03 0.007 0.07 -0.007 -0.06 0.010 0.09 
Private 0.005 0.13 0.009 0.21 0.006 0.15 0.009 0.22 
AssetChg -0.017 -0.54 -0.007 -0.23 -0.012 -0.36 -0.026 -0.84 
LivExpChg -0.034 -0.63 -0.018 -0.34 -0.017 -0.33 -0.026 -0.49 
LnFirmAge -0.134 -2.52* -0.128 -2.51* -0.118 -2.35* -0.104 -2.22* 
DAChg 0.268 0.58 0.281 0.61 0.268 0.57 0.374 0.80 
MBChg 0.005 0.25 0.007 0.38 0.007 0.37 0.001 0.06 
ROAChg 0.776 3.55** 0.860 3.77** 0.824 3.64** 0.786 3.41** 
Industry Dummy included         
Year Dummy included         
Adjusted R
2
 0.002  0.010  0.001  0.024  
F-statistics 1.347  2.566  1.082  4.409  
p-value 0.095  0.000  0.348  0.000  
         
 
* for significance at 0.05 level.   
** for significance at 0.01 level.   
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Table 5 
Multivariate Analysis for Level Compensation with Interaction Term of Private 
TFP is total factor productivity.  SaleLab is sales to number of employees (divided by 1,000,000).  Comp is 
average annual compensation of the three highest paid directors (divided by 1,000,000).  RelPay is the ratio of 
average annual compensation of the three highest paid directors to the average annual salary of an employee.  
LnBSize is the log value of the number of directors on the board. IndDir is the percentage of the number of 
independent directors to total number of directors on the board.  Post is a dummy variable coded 1 if the chairman 
and the general manager are different persons and 0 otherwise.  Private is a dummy variable coded 1 if the firm is a 
privately-owned enterprise and 0 otherwise.  LnAsset is the log value of total assets.  LivExp is the living 
expenditure level of the province where the firm is located (divided by 1,000).  LnFirmAge is the log value of the 
number of years the firm has been listed.  DA is debt to total assets.  MB is market value of equity to book value 
of equity.  ROA is return on assets.  t-statistics are computed using robust standard errors. 
 
Panel A: The dependent variable is TFP 
                  
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
 Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t 
                  
Intercept 1.270 2.30 0.128 0.23 0.386 0.72 1.652 2.95 
Comp 0.578 3.65**     1.603 5.71** 
RelPay   -0.017 -4.76**   -0.035 -5.52** 
RelPayPrivate   -0.006 -1.01   0.003 0.25 
CompRelPay     -0.006 -1.12 -0.017 -1.63 
CompRelPayPrivate     -0.007 -1.11 -0.007 -0.42 
LnBSize -0.081 -0.92 -0.029 -0.33 -0.051 -0.58 -0.044 -0.50 
IndDir 0.333 1.58 0.411 1.99* 0.380 1.84 0.350 1.72 
Post 0.043 0.78 0.021 0.39 0.031 0.57 0.023 0.44 
Private -0.069 -1.09 -0.006 -0.09 -0.074 -1.37 -0.046 -0.52 
LnAsset -0.094 -3.52** -0.041 -1.48 -0.050 -1.86 -0.109 -3.97** 
LivExp 0.054 5.75** 0.059 6.36** 0.059 6.32** 0.038 4.02** 
LnFirmAge -0.171 -5.36** -0.174 -5.22** -0.183 -5.34** -0.149 -4.70** 
DA 0.712 4.89** 0.713 5.12** 0.692 4.95** 0.760 5.41** 
MB 0.016 1.45 0.020 1.77 0.022 1.90 0.009 0.85 
ROA 3.173 10.30** 3.469 11.25** 3.377 10.92** 3.098 10.21** 
Industry Dummy included        
Year Dummy included         
Adjusted R
2
 0.099  0.104  0.093  0.132  
F-statistics 20.781  20.514  20.688  24.536  
p-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
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Table 5 (continued) 
Multivariate Analysis for Level Compensation with Interaction Term of Private 
 
Panel B: The dependent variable is SaleLab 
                  
 Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  
 Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t 
                  
Intercept -1.196 -1.47 -5.427 -7.31 -5.432 -7.24 -0.438 -0.53 
Comp 2.032 4.02**     5.932 6.09** 
RelPay   -0.057 -8.74**   -0.087 -6.76** 
RelPayPrivate   0.020 2.13*   0.037 2.19* 
CompRelPay     -0.042 -4.42** -0.151 -3.93** 
CompRelPayPrivate     0.020 1.62 0.093 2.06* 
LnBSize -0.494 -3.95** -0.409 -3.65** -0.443 -3.90** -0.398 -3.89** 
IndDir -0.337 -0.92 -0.087 -0.26 -0.110 -0.32 -0.358 -1.06 
Post -0.019 -0.15 -0.070 -0.60 -0.051 -0.44 -0.107 -0.93 
Private 0.065 0.72 -0.128 -1.27 -0.106 -1.50 0.088 0.76 
LnAsset 0.092 2.34* 0.305 8.03** 0.301 7.88** 0.061 1.53 
LivExp 0.087 4.68** 0.077 4.88** 0.079 4.84** 0.030 1.65 
LnFirmAge -0.027 -0.56 -0.136 -2.82** -0.141 -2.87** -0.019 -0.46 
DA 1.068 3.91** 0.800 3.55** 0.694 3.00** 1.239 4.79** 
MB 0.004 0.27 0.030 2.06* 0.037 2.45* -0.015 -1.06 
ROA 2.473 6.00** 3.035 6.50** 2.908 6.22** 2.306 5.93** 
Industry Dummy included         
Year Dummy included         
Adjusted R
2
 0.142  0.213  0.193  0.254  
F-statistics 32.742  49.691  41.470  52.480  
p-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
         
 
* for significance at 0.05 level.   
** for significance at 0.01 level.   
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Table 6 
Multivariate Analysis for Level Compensation with Interaction Term of COST 
TFP is total factor productivity.  SaleLab is sales to number of employees (divided by 1,000,000).  Comp is 
average annual compensation of the three highest paid directors (divided by 1,000,000).  RelPay is the ratio of 
average annual compensation of the three highest paid directors to the average annual salary of an employee.  
COST is total compensation for employees to sales.  LnBSize is the log value of the number of directors on the 
board. IndDir is the percentage of the number of independent directors to total number of directors on the board.  
Post is a dummy variable coded 1 if the chairman and the general manager are different persons and 0 otherwise.  
Private is a dummy variable coded 1 if the firm is a privately-owned firm and 0 otherwise.  LnAsset is the log value 
of total assets.  LivExp is the living expenditure level of the province where the firm is located (divided by 1,000).  
LnFirmAge is the log value of the number of years the firm has been listed.  DA is debt to total assets.  MB is 
market value of equity to book value of equity.  ROA is return on assets.  t-statistics are computed using robust 
standard errors. 
 
Panel A: The dependent variable is TFP 
                  
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
 Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t 
                  
Intercept 3.388 6.74 1.942 3.81 2.815 5.47 4.091 7.98 
Comp 0.596 3.37**     2.071 5.19** 
RelPay   -0.021 -2.98**   -0.030 -4.29** 
CompRelPay     -0.015 -2.50* -0.038 -2.18* 
Cost -6.333 -15.08** -5.954 -11.47** -6.600 -16.97** -5.732 -9.24** 
RelPayCost   0.028 0.33   -0.155 -2.54* 
CompRelPayCost     0.143 3.17** 0.291 1.67 
LnBSize -0.035 -0.44 0.027 0.33 -0.010 -0.12 0.020 0.27 
IndDir 0.181 0.92 0.289 1.46 0.233 1.18 0.197 1.06 
Post 0.026 0.53 0.002 0.04 -0.001 -0.03 -0.012 -0.26 
Private -0.156 -3.39** -0.096 -2.07* -0.133 -2.89** -0.100 -2.23* 
LnAsset -0.165 -6.82** -0.098 -3.94** -0.140 -5.47** -0.205 -8.21** 
LivExp 0.055 6.44** 0.065 7.68** 0.068 8.03** 0.044 5.25** 
LnFirmAge -0.162 -5.46** -0.165 -5.47** -0.142 -4.57** -0.109 -3.78** 
DA 0.320 2.42* 0.286 2.16* 0.330 2.53* 0.415 3.31** 
MB 0.031 3.21** 0.036 3.72** 0.033 3.29** 0.017 1.75 
ROA 1.894 7.08** 2.290 8.49** 2.092 7.81** 1.813 6.98** 
Industry Dummy included        
Year Dummy included        
Adjusted R
2
 0.247  0.242  0.246  0.301  
F-statistics 56.481  56.587  56.017  67.788  
p-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
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Table 6 (continued) 
Multivariate Analysis for Level Compensation with Interaction Term of COST 
 
Panel B: The dependent variable is SaleLab 
                  
 Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  
 Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t 
                  
Intercept -0.235 -0.27 -1.952 -2.74 -2.197 -2.98 1.681 1.87 
Comp 2.660 4.40**     8.126 6.21** 
RelPay   -0.077 -8.66**   -0.091 -6.75** 
CompRelPay     -0.043 -4.33** -0.244 -4.08** 
Cost -4.813 -5.55** -8.229 -10.45** -7.256 -11.27** -3.085 -1.98* 
RelPayCost   -0.348 -5.24**   -0.198 -2.00* 
CompRelPayCost     0.160 2.38* 1.895 3.05** 
LnBSize -0.474 -4.00** -0.348 -3.21** -0.442 -3.69** -0.313 -3.40** 
IndDir -0.167 -0.50 -0.182 -0.55 -0.298 -0.85 -0.182 -0.60 
Post -0.049 -0.43 -0.076 -0.66 -0.054 -0.46 -0.112 -1.05 
Private -0.143 -2.17* -0.041 -0.64 -0.133 -1.92 -0.046 -0.84 
LnAsset 0.070 1.67 0.239 6.49** 0.188 5.02** 0.037 1.01 
LivExp 0.083 4.93** 0.085 5.32** 0.101 5.72** 0.038 2.41* 
LnFirmAge -0.045 -0.95 -0.105 -2.30* -0.031 -0.67 -0.040 -0.99 
DA 0.419 1.84 0.387 1.83 0.664 2.69** 0.463 2.30* 
MB 0.024 1.72 0.042 2.97** 0.038 2.56** 0.008 0.65 
ROA 1.119 2.95** 1.713 4.15** 1.887 4.31** 0.955 2.77** 
Industry Dummy included         
Year Dummy included         
Adjusted R
2
 0.235  0.266  0.191  0.385  
F-statistics 52.867  57.140  40.914  86.549  
p-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
         
 
* for significance at 0.05 level.   
** for significance at 0.01 level.   
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Table 7 
Multivariate Analysis for Level Compensation with interaction term of Government Quality 
TFP is total factor productivity.  SaleLab is sales to number of employees (divided by 1,000,000).  Comp is 
average annual compensation of the three highest paid directors (divided by 1,000,000).  RelPay is the ratio of 
average annual compensation of the three highest paid directors to the average annual salary of an employee.  GQ 
is the aggregate measure of government quality.  LnBSize is the log value of the number of directors on the board. 
IndDir is the percentage of the number of independent directors to total number of directors on the board.  Post is a 
dummy variable coded 1 if the chairman and the general manager are different persons and 0 otherwise.  LnAsset is 
the log value of total assets.  LivExp is the living expenditure level of the province where the firm is located 
(divided by 1,000).  LnFirmAge is the log value of the number of years the firm has been listed.  DA is debt to 
total assets.  MB is market value of equity to book value of equity.  ROA is return on assets.  t-statistics are 
computed using robust standard errors. 
 
Panel A: The dependent variable is TFP 
                  
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
 Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t 
                  
Intercept 1.372 2.50 0.181 0.32 0.474 0.85 1.726 3.04 
Comp 0.428 1.28     1.152 1.83 
RelPay   -0.017 -2.06*   -0.026 -1.92 
CompRelPay     -0.004 -0.49 -0.023 -0.89 
GQ -0.018 -1.30 -0.006 -0.43 -0.011 -0.99 -0.016 -0.92 
RelPayGQ   0.000 -0.29   -0.002 -0.72 
CompRelPayGQ     -0.001 -0.48 0.001 0.12 
LnBSize -0.080 -0.90 -0.042 -0.47 -0.063 -0.71 -0.036 -0.41 
IndDir 0.343 1.63 0.422 2.06* 0.395 1.90 0.349 1.70 
Post 0.044 0.81 0.021 0.40 0.028 0.52 0.031 0.58 
Private -0.095 -1.86 -0.044 -0.83 -0.076 -1.49 -0.045 -0.92 
LnAsset -0.097 -3.69** -0.038 -1.37 -0.052 -1.92 -0.109 -4.04** 
LivExp 0.056 6.08** 0.060 6.58** 0.062 6.74** 0.038 4.18** 
LnFirmAge -0.171 -5.35** -0.179 -5.39** -0.178 -5.33** -0.164 -5.29** 
DA 0.718 4.90** 0.706 4.86** 0.697 4.87** 0.810 5.64** 
MB 0.016 1.50 0.021 1.89 0.022 1.92 0.006 0.54 
ROA 3.196 10.37** 3.477 11.19** 3.428 11.11** 3.113 10.23** 
Industry Dummy included        
Year Dummy included        
Adjusted R
2
 0.101  0.105  0.095  0.134  
F-statistics 21.701  20.860  18.706  26.412  
p-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
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Table 7 (continued) 
Multivariate Analysis for Level Compensation with interaction term of Government Quality 
 
Panel B: The dependent variable is SaleLab 
                  
 Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  
 Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t 
                  
Intercept -2.175 -2.39 -4.705 -5.65 -4.149 -5.62 0.030 0.04 
Comp 1.098 1.26     3.807 2.31* 
RelPay   -0.064 -4.80**   -0.079 -3.58** 
CompRelPay     -0.041 -1.98* -0.111 -1.53 
GQ -0.017 -0.90 -0.010 -0.41 -0.011 -0.64 -0.058 -2.13* 
RelPayGQ   0.003 1.31   0.001 0.32 
CompRelPayGQ     0.002 0.60 0.000 0.04 
LnBSize -0.587 -4.35** -0.453 -3.47** -0.482 -3.91** -0.465 -4.03 
IndDir -0.164 -0.46 0.073 0.21 -0.061 -0.18 -0.186 -0.55 
Post 0.001 0.01 -0.064 -0.55 -0.041 -0.34 -0.052 -0.45 
Private -0.096 -1.35 0.066 1.00 -0.071 -0.98 0.011 0.17 
LnAsset 0.174 4.11** 0.278 6.71** 0.290 7.55** 0.066 1.71 
LivExp 0.069 4.00 0.087 5.08** 0.080 4.59** 0.029 1.70 
LnFirmAge -0.096 -1.97* -0.084 -1.63 -0.085 -1.79 0.004 0.09 
DA 0.923 3.45** 1.024 3.82** 0.758 3.08** 1.399 4.96** 
MB 0.016 1.09 0.016 1.10 0.029 1.88 -0.018 -1.30 
ROA 2.418 5.49** 3.086 6.15** 3.131 6.31** 2.492 5.90** 
Industry Dummy 
included 
        
Year Dummy included         
Adjusted R
2
 0.171  0.175  0.165  0.240  
F-statistics 34.823  37.888  34.319  51.487  
p-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
         
 
* for significance at 0.05 level.   
** for significance at 0.01 level.   
  
 
